



Bittersweet Lessons and Promising Vistas

Citizen Participation's Place in Improving the Quality of
Democracy in Peru

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Abstract

International development literature has extensively documented how poor governance in Latin America inhibits economic growth and improved distribution. To help remedy these problems and promote accountability, some NGOs and academics have urged creation of official institutions for citizen participation. A wealth of high-quality comparative research has sought to isolate the conditions under which these types of institutions function best. In contrast, this paper seeks to answer how well these institutions are functioning for promoting accountability and what lessons should be drawn from these experiences. Three municipalities in Peru are evaluated through surveys, in-depth interviews, budget analyses, and personal observations. The study finds that, in Peru, these institutions have not improved accountability. Given such a finding, it recommends that additional research examine participatory reforms in the greater institutional context to determine which institutions and approaches should receive scarce resources in order to best strengthen democracy.

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Introduction

International development literature has extensively documented how poor governance in Latin America inhibits economic growth and improved distribution. To help remedy these problems, some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and academics have urged greater citizen participation in public affairs. They argue that intense citizen participation will finally motivate and compel wayward Latin American leaders to act in the public interest. There is considerable debate over the efficacy of such a strategy, and much scholarship has focused on the conditions under which participatory institutions work best and the institutional designs that are most propitious. This paper is not about the conditions under which participatory institutions work best. Instead it is about empirically and critically examining Peruvian participatory institutions to evaluate their contribution to improving accountability. This examination is part of a larger question: given limited resources, where do Peruvian leaders put their time, resources, and energy to strengthen Peru's democracy?

This paper reports and analyzes the results of a case study in Peru and evaluates a particularly involved type of citizen participation, “co-governance,” which other authors have called “participatory publics”, “empowered participatory governance”, and “empowered deliberative democracy” (Ackerman 2004, Wampler and Avritzer 2004, Fung and Wright 2001). According to John Ackerman, co-governance happens when, “in addition to co-producing specific services and pressuring government from the outside, societal actors can also participate directly in the core functions of government itself” (Ackerman 2004, 451). Proponents of this idea see little ability of excluded, marginalized citizens to positively impact public decisions under traditional democratic structures, so they recommend the inclusion of those citizens in the governing process (Goetz and Jenkins 2002). Papers by Ackerman, Goetz and Jenkins, Avritzer, Wampler, and Fung and Wright examine what they term ‘successful’ cases of co-governance. For them, co-governance brings a higher quality of democracy because it promotes accountability, works with local realities, involves non-traditional actors, develops the capacities of civil society, and promotes citizen participation (Ackerman 2004 Goetz and Jenkins 2002, Fung and Wright 2001, Avritzer 2000, Wampler 2004, Cabannes 2004). Accountability is defined in this paper as, “the degree to which citizens are able to discern good governments from bad ones and can sanction each type appropriately” (Przeworski and Stokes and Manin 1999, Introduction.) Accountability is the idea that the poor politicians and governments can be constrained into better behavior and better policymaking, and that those politicians and governments that will not be constrained can be removed.

Peru provides a fascinating case to study the degree to which co-governance improves accountability. From 2001-2003, with the strong support of the international development community, the government implemented laws designed to foster democratic inclusion and participation through co-governance. This paper used results from extensive interviewing of local leaders, a series of budget analyses, field observations, and a survey of the general population to analyze the co-governance institutions. The study finds that in Peru, at least, providing a formal space for citizen participation in the policy process has made little contribution to accountability of politicians and governments.

II. The Continuing Debate on Citizen Participation

Numerous studies have documented a wide arrange of benefits to co-governance in a variety of nations and governments (Wampler and Avritzner 2004). Fung and Wright find that co-governance, or empowered deliberative democracy, has been shown to successfully transform democratic polities to respond to the complexities of modern state-society relations. One particularly valuable contribution is their organization of the critical factors that determine when participatory institutions are successful, which can also be interpreted as a means for evaluating the success of these institutions, an approach that has been partially adopted for this paper (Fung and Wright 2001). Much good research has singled out Porto Alegre, Brazil as a successful case, with its high rates of participation, proven better outcomes, and positive political impacts such as challenges to an established clientelist order. Baiocchi concludes that the Porto Alegre experiment demonstrates that empowered deliberative democracy holds promise for crafting better, more equitable, and more effective policies (Baiocchi 2001). Work by Nylen confirms the benefits of co-governance for raising levels of participation citizen interest (Nylen 2002). Wampler and Avritzner discuss how co-governance in Brazil is the latest and most comprehensive institutional manifestation of the work of “participatory publics,” or groups of organized citizens who seek to effect positive change and overcome marginalization through democratic deliberation and the approval of their chosen policies (Wampler and Avritzner 2004). Co-governance experiments have generated sustained interest among the international academic community in recent years from the positive cases and promising potential in the future.

Similarly, co-governance reforms have been of interest to many leaders in academia and in NGOs within Peru. Dr. Aldo Panfichi is one of the foremost scholars on participatory reforms and government at Peru’s prestigious Catholic University. With Dagnino and Olvera, he categorizes three different political directions, or political projects, on which Latin American nations have embarked. They divide these projects into “authoritarian,” “participatory democratic,” and “neoliberal” categories. With authoritarianism in latency, they propose that participatory democracy is in confrontation with neo-liberalism in Latin America (Dagnino and Olvera and Panfichi 2006). Seen through this lens, participatory reforms represent a hopeful alternative to the perceived failures of neoliberalism in this region. Grupo Propuesta Ciudadana is

one of the larger Peruvian NGOs and is devoted to promoting further decentralization and participation reforms. For example, it publishes articles and pamphlets arguing that new participatory institutions are necessary for Peru to advance (Azpur 2006). Other large non-profits such as DESCO, and IEP have all published in-depth studies on participation and are member organizations of Grupo Propuesta Ciudadana. A major multi-year study analyzed by Grompone, Tanaka, and Melendez organizes and catalogues cases of co-governance, with the vast majority of those cases described as successful (Grompone 2005, Tanaka and Meléndez 2005). CARE, the well-funded international NGO that focuses on hunger issues, in Peru emphasizes building local participatory capacities as a central goal of its development programs (CARE Peru Project FOGEL, accessed online May 12th 2007). Peru has been disappointed by the continued absence of prosperity and improved distribution, and for many Peruvians, participatory reforms represent a better possibility for doing public business.

However, several theoretical critiques in international and Peruvian literature question whether co-governance will induce a more accountable government. First, true co-governance reforms depend upon central government enforcement, enthusiasm for radical citizen participation among local elected leaders, or an upsurge from the population. The weakness of central governments in many developing nations precludes enforcement of participatory laws. It is also unlikely that local politicians will voluntarily relinquish power unless citizens demand co-governance at the polls or unless one political faction chooses co-governance to weaken an opposing institution, such as the mayor wishing to weaken city council (Goldfrank and Schneider 2005, Grompone 2005). This final possibility could bring very poor outcomes, as a closed network of local strong men could make their own bad decisions, without even the constraint of unwieldy national bureaucracy that might inject a small amount of due process into policymaking (Andersson and van Laerhoven 2007). Neither is citizen demand for co-governance assured. Citizens might easily prioritize tangible deliverables such as the construction of parks, sanitation systems, and roads over good participatory processes.

A second reason to pause for thought is the uncertainty of an individual citizen's desire to participate in intense deliberative democracy to a significant enough degree to improve accountability (Fung and Wright 2001). When faced with the competing interests of a job, the need to put food on the table, family, and leisure, many citizens may decline to participate. It is not clear that enough citizens would

want to participate, even by meeting and electing citizen representatives for the process to measurably impact accountability (Remy 2005, Huber 2005).

Third, without effective institutions such as the press, interest groups, and political parties, citizen participation in co-governance decisions and administration could be extremely underwhelming. Consider an average group of busy citizens of any nation poring over arcane municipal budgets or inch-thick binders on public works projects without training in accounting or engineering. It is unlikely that such a group would root out corruption or general mismanagement without spending inordinate amounts of time, always a scarce commodity. Some cases of co-governance such as Porto Alegre have elected to offer training to citizens to rectify this problem, with substantial benefits (Baiocchi 2001). If the quality and quantity is sufficient, training may solve such a problem, but it is a challenge to be overcome (Huber 2005).

Some theorists suggest that other institutions might increase accountability and serve the democracy-strengthening process in developing democracies such as Peru better than co-governance (Cleary and Stokes, 2006). For example, a liberal-democratic theory emphasizes the conventional, liberal-democratic institutions as the watchdogs that constrain the government's failures (Arnold 1993). In the ideal of this theory these liberal-democratic institutions would include 1) powerful non-executive branches and independent agencies of government (like an ombudsman) and especially 2) a judicial branch that functions and is accessible to the population, 3) a system of organized, ideologically-based political parties, 4) a fair, professional, and investigative press, and 5) interest groups and grassroots groups working for the public interest.

This liberal-democratic theory sees a division of labor, where each group's incentives drive its actions. The five institutions outlined above have the incentive to find detailed information on any wrongdoing or policy problems and let citizens know about it. Combined with frequent and fair elections, citizens ideally would have a great deal of help in holding their government accountable. This theory depends upon the condition that citizens themselves have little incentive to expend enormous amounts of time gathering political and policy data (Arnold 1993, Remy 2005).

These liberal-democratic institutions are presented as examples of alternative institutions in order to place participatory institutions into their proper context. Does co-governance measurably improve accountability, or are its critics correct? In this context, the appropriate normative democratic question becomes: if the international

development community wishes to strengthen democracy, on what types of institutions does it focus its resources? Answering this question requires the type of results-based analysis of participatory institutions attempted in this paper as a starting point.

III. The Peruvian Case Study

Peru is an appropriate place to examine whether co-governance substantially improves accountability. From 2001 to 2003 the central government created a set of institutions that seek to raise accountability and promote better policymaking through co-governance. Some of the most important of these institutions are 1) the Concerted Roundtable of Struggle Against Poverty (CRSAP), 2) the rendition of accounts, 3) the concerted development plan, and 4) the participatory budget. The Councils of Regional Coordination and Councils of Local Coordination, two other institutions created in these reforms, have been purposefully omitted from this study. Both Peruvian law and preliminary interviews showed that in Lima, where this study was carried out, these last two institutions met very infrequently with little activity.

In the CRSAP, members of civil society meet to propose policy solutions to poverty. The CRSAP then pressures the municipality to implement its policies. The rendition of accounts is the idea that the mayor must transparently present the functions of government to the people on a regular basis. The concerted development plan is a process by which the citizens of the municipality are supposed to come together and create a plan for the town highlighting its vision, objectives, and goals. The municipal budget and the participatory budget, part of the municipal budget, are supposed to follow this plan.

The participatory budget is the most important co-governance institution. It is a portion of the municipal budget wherein the population, through registered citizen organizations that have been allowed to join the process, actually recommends spending priorities. Mainly investments in infrastructure (Peruvian Law 28056, Chapter 2), the priorities must follow the concerted development plan, be approved by a municipal technical committee, be approved by the National System of Public Investments, and finally be approved by the municipality's elected city council. Each participatory budget is carried out in the year before the municipal budget so that the

projects can be included in the municipal budget. Thus, in this paper the references to the participatory budget for the year 2007 means the process was carried out in 2006.

Peruvian law requires these processes in all 1832 districts of Peru, which is to say that they make up a significant reform. It is important to note that of all the state reforms possible at the end of the Fujimori government, the decentralization and participation reforms advanced more quickly than reforms of, for example, the judicial power, or the education system, etc. Progress on these other reforms has been slow, with systematic reform opposed by powerful organized constituencies inside and outside of government. In contrast, by June of 2007, the decentralization and participation reform, of which the participatory institutions are a significant part, counted on new institutions with supporting laws, bureaucracies, and policies created by the executive branch to improve the functioning of at least some of these institutions, especially participatory budgeting (Sanchez Velarde 2005). These institutions were created and designed in Lima, and handed down to the 1832 districts, a classic case of top-down reforms with implications for these reforms' efficacy (Wampler 2004, Sanchez Velarde 2005). As policy change and monitoring of the implementation of these institutions has also come from Lima during the years since 2003, the adaptability and enforcement of these institutions has also been impacted by the top-down approach.

Cases were chosen by quantitatively measuring the different levels of implementation of participatory reforms based upon reports from municipalities to the Ministry of Economics and Finances. Ten Lima municipalities were ranked in the order of the degree to which their municipal records showed their governments had implemented the letter of the law of the participatory reforms. Reported information included the number of public meetings, the timeliness of meetings and notifications, and other such information available in Appendix 1. Three case studies corresponding to the low, middle, and high degree of implementation of participatory reforms were, respectively, the municipalities of Barranco, Villa El Salvador, and Jesús María. Although Villa El Salvador has historically been a center of participatory governance, please note that Jesús María actually completed more of the required directives for the implementation of participatory reforms and won the corresponding recognition from NGOs and the national government. Jesús María is the "high degree of participatory reforms" case in this paper.

With a population of about 45,000 people, Barranco is the smallest municipality in Lima (Municipalidad Distrital de Barranco 2006). It is a historic part of town with beautiful old houses, many of which need serious repair. Many people in the town know each other and worry that their opportunity to utilize their city's historical palaces as an economic development engine is being squandered. The municipality did not carry out a participatory budget process during 2006 for the year 2007, and the former mayor (term 2002-2006) is under judicial investigation for corruption.

Villa El Salvador is famous for its participatory history. It is a poorer community located in southern Lima of about 400,000 residents (Municipalidad Distrital de Villa El Salvador 2006), of which about 1500 participated in at least one of the nine participatory budgeting meetings. Villa El Salvador (VES) designated about 13% of its total budget to be decided through participation.

Jesús María (population 70,000) has won national prizes for its participatory budgeting process, including the top award for a district from a prestigious, donor-backed NGO (Cuidadanos al Día 2006) as well as first prize in the Ministry of Economics and Finances' "Contest of Successful Participatory Budgeting Experiences" (Ministry of Economics and Finances 2006). This prize signifies that the central government believes that Jesús María was the best executor of participatory budgeting of all of the 1832 districts in Peru. 1850 citizens, including schoolchildren, participated at one time or another over the course of twenty-one workshops and meetings. The municipality held a full rendition of accounts to the population of the entire municipal budget including the 1.73% of it designated to participatory budgeting (Municipalidad Distrital de Jesús María 2006). It is important to note that Jesús María and VES should not be compared apples to apples in terms of the appropriations to their participatory budget. Because VES is relatively poor, it receives transfers from the national government for infrastructure projects, a portion of which must be decided by the participatory budget. In addition, because the participatory budget is primarily in place to fund infrastructure improvements, VES with its transfers can devote a great deal of funding to the participatory process.

IV. The Results

The following results detail first, the legal power enjoyed by the institution in question, measured by the specificity in the law, and second, the real-world strength of these institutions, measured by observations of whether elected leaders must carry out or comply with the institutional processes discussed above.

In Peruvian law governing the rendition of accounts, the district governments are supposed to render accounts of their government's activities to the people upon demand. However, the law does not specify how often the mayor should render accounts, what information he should offer, how accessibly he should present it, to whom he should present it, when he should present it, or if he must allow questions or criticism from the population (Peruvian Law 27972). Nor are there clear sanctions for simply refusing to render the accounts. Since the rendition of accounts was instituted as part of the Organic Municipal Law in 2003, no changes in law, policy, or regulation that had measurably improved monitoring or institutional design could be found at the time this research was carried out. There was no evidence of a mechanism for improving or changing the enforcement or implementation of the rendition of accounts to overcome the challenges it is facing. Therefore, the existing legal framework cannot even support a theoretical supposition that the rendition of accounts will improve accountability.

Unfortunately, the mayor rarely renders the accounts on the municipal budget and programs. Out of ten Lima municipalities evaluated to determine the case studies, only one municipality had done so, Jesús María. This information is consistent with informal non-interview conversations with various government employees, NGO workers, and citizens.

Concerning the Concerted Roundtable of Struggle Against Poverty (CRSAP), neither of the executive decrees that created this institution includes any specific power or guarantee of resources to it (Peruvian Law 27972). If the mayor wishes, the CRSAP could fulfill functions related to reducing corruption and promoting accountability. However, these institutions have no real legal power on their own; even in theory they cannot be expected improve accountability.

In practice, the Roundtables are not present at the district level in Lima. They are present at the sub-metropolitan level encompassing about ten districts each, so all

interviews were taken from these institutions. At the meetings of the sub-metropolitan roundtables for central and southern Lima, the leadership related that they have almost no funding, and that they limit their activities mainly to educational workshops (Dadok Personal Observation February 23, 2007). The CRSAPs write general policy goals such as, "To incorporate in the agenda of priorities the promotion and generation of employment" (Plan de Trabajo MCLCP-Lima Sur 2007). An interviewee related that the CRSAPs struggled to convince local government officials to attend even a monthly meeting (Local Government Official M 2007). For example, Barranco did not participate at the time of this study. In part, this difficulty may be caused by the national roundtable mandating priorities to local roundtables, eliminating the possibility for a true participatory agenda. More important probably is the fact that these institutions at the local level have no legal or administrative power and extremely little, if any, funding. It is possible that the CRSAPs are struggling with the creation of the newer participatory institutions, as the CRSAPs were created earliest, in 2001, and now in a sense must compete with the participatory budget for citizens' time and energy. As of this research, the national government had become less and less formally involved in the CRSAPs since the chartering law and now only is involved in the contribution of a very small appropriation. The roundtables at the district level report to the next level up all the way to the national roundtable, but monitoring and adaptability to difficulties appeared lacking. Besides conversations within the meetings about the difficulties and those minutes being handed up to the national roundtable for some type of decision or institutional change, no formal mechanism exists for improving or changing the function of the institution. In Southern Lima, including VES, the technical secretary seemed interested in using the name recognition of the CRSAP to transform it into more of a watchdog group. However, in practice, it is difficult to find evidence that the CRSAPs contribute to better accountability.

The Peruvian participatory laws clearly state that each municipality will develop a Concerted Development Plan (CDP) in conjunction with citizen participation (Peruvian Law 27783). However, the law does not specify how the mayor must involve participation. Nor does it require any type of specificity to the CDP in terms of policy directions. The law makes no mention of who will enforce this CDP or what the mechanism is for correctly problems or resolving difficulties in the institutional design. At the time of this research, the CDP had not received the same policy direction as had the participatory budgeting except as an extension of that participatory budgeting process. However, the CDP is supposed to guide the entire municipality's spending

priorities, not just those of the participatory budget. The CDP appears to have been administratively relegated to an outgrowth of the participatory budget, but no enforcement mechanism is in place for it, so it has little ability to adapt or grow as an institution on its own. Again, the mayor may manipulate this institution and it can not be expected even in theory that these institutions will exercise a power to improve accountability.

In actuality, many districts' plans look alike and suffer from vagueness of recommendations, such as VES's plan, which encourages the government to "Achieve better nutrition for the vulnerable and impoverished population" (Municipalidad Distrital de Villa El Salvador 2006, Plan de Desarrollo Concertado para 2021) as one of its specific program recommendations. In general, a local leader can implement any health, education, culture, participation, economic development, or security policy and it will be within the bounds of the vague CDP.

Peruvian law more specifically defines requirements of participatory budgeting than the previously mentioned processes, so greater focus was given to results describing this institution. The law requires implementation of participatory budgeting, including a detailed eight-step process. It calls for the municipal budget to designate some of its funds toward participatory budgeting and for the municipality to provide a special rendition of accounts for the participatory budget. In spite of this specificity, the law allows local authorities to determine the number of meetings, the number of training sessions on local problems, and the method of rendition of the participatory budget's accounts (Peruvian Law 28056). The Ministry of Economics and Finances' Budget Office has taken charge of regulating the participatory budget, and all district-level municipalities must deposit their participatory budgeting documents with the Ministry. The ministry also updates the participatory budgeting law and guidelines every year, so that, it is hoped, the institutions can respond to problems and challenges and improve with time. These instructions from the central government have attempted to inject more control and lessen the mayoral discretion, but still specificity is an issue. If the participatory budgets are not completed, the Ministry of Economics and Finances can deny that government part of its transfer payment from the national government. Consequently, it can be expected that municipalities will carry out a participatory budget, but one of unknown quality. Finally, the municipality may forbid citizens who have not properly registered from participating. Registration is a bureaucratic process that demands registrants prove they represent a citizen

organization that has existed for three years and is in 'good standing' with the municipality.

In reality, many municipalities do not complete participatory budgets (Ministry of Economics and Finances Records). Some participatory budgets are completed in one weekend or in a couple of months as opposed to the 10 month process beginning in February recommended by the Ministry of Economics and Finances (Ministry of Economics and Finances' Database of participatory budgeting experiences). In practice, denying municipality transfer funds based on incomplete participatory budgets does happen, but the process is politically delicate. It has passed in Lima that a municipality, threatened with funding stops, will convene a participatory budget in late November or December for a day or two in order to complete the letter of the law and restore funding. The Ministry is trying to ensure better and timelier compliance, but with 1832 districts, plus provincial and regional government, success is difficult.

In-depth interviews on co-governance institutions

Fifty-two citizens involved in various aspects of the participatory institutions were interviewed in depth, the majority about the participatory budget. They included citizen leaders involved in participatory institutions, elected leaders, NGO professionals, and members of the press. In common across the three case studies, the fifty-two interviewees shared strong support for the ideas of open government, citizen participation, and participatory budgeting. In fact, many interviewees went so far as to confuse one with another and believed that open government necessarily meant participatory budgeting. Participatory budgeting has been promoted by the Left, the government, and many civil society organizations as the way to participate in real decision-making. Interviewees spoke positively about participatory budgeting in general terms, saying that it allowed the "option to discuss the needs [of the community]" (Citizen Leader E 2007) or that participatory budgeting permitted that "the costs [of public works projects] can be known" (Citizen Leader F 2007). At the same time, many interviewees criticized the practical functioning of participatory budgeting in serious and specific ways. These two sentiments are reconciled by recognizing that Peruvians, as most other peoples around the world, value having a say in their government. That is, they value participation as an inherent, normative good. At the same time, respondents are intelligent observers of the process and see its real-world problems. Therefore, this study acknowledges here that interviewees supported

the theoretical idea of participatory budgeting as a manifestation of more participation, and rather than repeating that general sentiment, focuses instead on reporting and evaluating interviewees' substantive criticisms with the functioning of the process in its real manifestation.

Because of this wish to avoid repeating general comments supporting participation when they add little new information to the record, this study could be mistaken as biased, and it is important to address the idea directly. Support for the general idea of participation through its accepted and sanctioned institutions was high from virtually all those interviewed. However, most interviewees specifically reported a variety of problems with the implementation and impacts. This study has acknowledged the popularity of the idea of participation and will focus on the mechanics of the institutions' functioning. If many problems exist, it does not signify bias or unfair presentation that such problems are honestly and rigorously documented.

The municipal government of Barranco did not carry out a participatory budget at all in 2006, violating the participatory budgeting law. For this study, the 2005 process for the year 2006 was examined. In that participatory budget, all interviewed citizens who were not municipal employees believed that the municipality had manipulated the process so that its preferred projects would be chosen. Manipulation was cited even by citizen leaders who had won approval of their project, such as Citizen Leader A, who related, "to be close to the administration causes approval of the project" (Citizen Leader A 2007). Member of the Technical Committee B, a member of the committee charged with evaluating the projects for the municipality, had quit the committee in frustration. She said, "the proposals, as they had previously been-how can I say it- already formulated...I do not know if they came from the municipality nor for what purpose they won...I did not want to be part of something that was already decided...I did not want to be manipulated by the municipality."

The citizens verified that Barranco never implemented the municipality's chosen project of repairing the extensive network of broken sidewalks around the city, with the result that the large population of elderly citizens often falls in the streets. Budget documents that might have confirmed implementation had been inexplicably lost by the municipality. The injuries the elderly citizens sustain and the hardships to their families represent a serious failure of accountability.

In Villa El Salvador, interviewed citizens, NGOs, and even the interviewed central government employee working there agreed that the municipality unduly influenced the process. The investigations of Local Press Member W, who edits the newspaper serving the town, revealed that the municipality seemed to politically influence the choices of the participatory budgeting priorities. Local Press Member W described how, “the municipality intervenes in the elections of the citizen groups, in the committees for local coordination...in everything it can, [the municipality] intervenes” (Local Press Member W 2007). Citizen Leader R, who did not have his project approved, strongly felt that the municipality worked behind citizens’ backs (Citizen Leader R 2007). Citizen leaders also talked about the problems they faced finding resources and training so that they could properly propose and monitor the public works being done under the participatory budget. Citizen Leader D, whose project was approved in the participatory budget, nevertheless vented, “We do not have a single cent to spend on the logistical work of the committees [that monitor projects]...We do not have lawyers, engineers, or money to hire these people” (Citizen Leader D 2007).

Citizen leaders criticized the licensing of public works projects, maintaining that the municipal government would not allow an examination of the costs or provide an open bidding process (Local Press Member W 2007, Citizen Leader R 2007, Citizen Leader D 2007). The municipality rendered the participatory budget’s accounts unsatisfactorily, only presenting the progress of the on-schedule projects and omitting reports on projects that were delayed or canceled, as well as omitting the discussion of the municipal budget (Dadok Personal Observation September 29, 2006). Citizen leaders did not understand why some neighborhoods received libraries, paved streets, and sanitation services, while their areas had only recently obtained running water. Citizen Leader E, who did not have a project approved, explained, “Why do I tell you that it is irregular the way they distribute things around here? Because [the technical committees] prioritize, for example, the neighborhoods that have a certain relationship with the mayor, or with the groups that generally predominate in city hall” (Citizen Leader E 2007).

Jesús María is known as one of the wealthiest and best educated districts in Peru. Many trained professionals reside there and the city has won awards for participatory budgeting. As in other cases, in spite of the support among interviewees for open government, participation, and participatory budgeting, a majority of citizen

leaders interviewed believed that manipulation, irregularities, or corruption existed in the way the participatory budget's projects were decided.

Citizen Leader G, a professional with training in the area of his project proposal, whose unapproved project followed the goals set out in the concerted development plan recounted, "at the hour of the [technical] evaluation of projects, I do not know how the evaluation was done to determine the assignment of resources. I do not know who is the person that made, revised, prioritized, or assigned resources, I just do not know." He remembered that when his citizen committee, in charge of security projects for the participatory budget presented their ideas, the project died in the technical committee. "There is where it stayed, they never called me, and really my project complied with all the criteria..." When he went to the municipality to speak with the functionary he recounted, "they never gave me an audience, and finally I had to resort to speak to the mayor. I told him 'I have been elected by the community to do this: present a project. The people are demanding of me 'what is going on?' I have a social pact with the people. I do not have any interest and I do not make any money here but I must have an answer: What is happening?' The mayor sent me to talk to the functionary again...it appeared that he attended to me in bad faith, that he did not like the pressure...but he told me that my project would be included in the final project." When Citizen Leader G saw the final participatory budget, he claims he "saw none of what [he] had proposed" (Citizen Leader G 2007). Although only an example of comments received through interviews, the multiple challenges to the honesty of the system are disturbing.

Budget analyses demonstrate funding irregularities

Because Jesús María has won several prizes for its successful participatory budget experience, a budget analysis was conducted in this municipality in addition to the in-depth interviews carried out in all three municipalities. The purpose of these analyses was to determine whether projects prioritized by citizens in the participatory budget were actually approved by the technical committee and then implemented. It was also asked whether the municipal budget follows the preferences revealed by the participatory budget.

It should be noted that Peruvian municipal budgets present almost insurmountable barriers to citizen vigilance. Instead of clearly listing budget items, the municipal budgets list the department or general goal (ex. city police, building capacity

of social organizations, etc) and then under the general goal list unspecific expenditure categories such as “personnel,” “supplies,” or “variable and occasional costs.” In Jesús María, detailed analysis revealed the enormous challenge of confirming that participatory projects survived from proposal to implementation. The majority of participatory projects could not be located in the municipal budget document, making it impossible to determine if funding had been disbursed.¹ For those projects that could be located, the municipality did not fulfill many of its funding obligations. For example, the participatory budgeting process in 2005 for the 2006 fiscal year prioritized a citizen security project. This project was approved to receive 97% funding in the beginning of year 2006 municipal budget, but by the end of 2006 it had been funded at a rate of only 4.08%. Also, 37.1% of this project’s funding had been annulled (Municipalidad Distrital de Jesús María Presupuesto Institucional de Aapertura 2006, Municipalidad Distrital de Jesús María Presupuesto Institucional Final Ajustado 2006, Municipalidad Distrital de Jesús María Documento de Presupuesto Participativo 2006).

Even more revealing than delays and underfunding of citizen priorities is the authorities’ clear disdain for citizens’ policy preferences revealed by the participatory budgeting process. Using the same security expenditure example, it is clear from the information taken from the Jesús María budgetary documents depicted in the chart below, that municipal discretionary expenditure on security grew by 17.5% from 2006 to 2007 in spite of the fact that the citizens clearly revealed a preference for security funding in the 2006 budget and not in the process creating the 2007 budget. The chart below shows that the municipality adjusted its discretionary funding, which dwarfs the participatory budget, to fund its priorities in a year where the participatory budget does not prioritize the municipality’s chosen projects. This example is only one of many, showing lack of correlation between municipal budget expenditures and citizens’ priorities. Because the participatory budget makes up a small amount of the municipal budget, authorities can ignore the citizen preferences completely in their budgetary decisions.

¹ The end of the year adjusted budgets did not label general categories and did not comply with the accepted reporting standards; all entries were listed with exactly the same project code, which thwarted efforts at monitoring or accountability. It should be kept in mind that Jesús María had won the most awards during the time of this study for its participatory experience. It is likely that other municipalities in Peru keep less clear accounting.

**Table 1:
From the Jesús María Municipal Budgets of 2006 and 2007**

Citizen Security Expenditure	2006 (En nuevos soles)	2007 (En nuevos soles)	% Change in municipal discretionary spending
Participatory Budgeting Appropriation	202,530	-	N/A*
Total Municipal Budget Appropriation	2,844,358	3,104,572	N/A
Municipal Discretionary Expenditure	2,641,828	3,104,572	+17.5%

*No available

Out of Jesús María's six total projects from the participatory budget approved for inclusion in the municipal budget, only the aforementioned security project could be found in the implementation step at 4.08% of its allotted funding. It is possible that the municipality implemented parts of other projects, but the difficulty experienced attempting to decipher the unnamed budget categories does not bode well for busy citizen leaders who wish to monitor funding.

For comparison, out of Villa El Salvador's forty-two total projects from the participatory budget approved for inclusion in the municipal budget, thirty-five could be found in the final implementation steps and average funding rate was 82% of the amount budgeted in the municipal budget (Municipalidad Distrital de Villa El Salvador 2007). Why does Villa El Salvador fulfill its funding obligations to a much higher degree? The answer may have to do with the national government appropriations VES receives, but more research would be required. In Barranco, no proof could be found of implementation of either of the two projects from the participatory budget from the 2005 process.

In-depth interview and survey data from

Jesus Maria shows lack of citizen interest and capacity

Part of understanding participatory institutions' capability to demand accountability is determining the capacity of the citizens and citizen leaders to evaluate the budgets and public works projects as they must do under participatory budgeting to make the process effective. NGO Worker K, an experienced NGO

professional who works in implementation of participatory budgeting, believes in the processes' value. He had spearheaded the award-winning Jesús María process, but confided to me, "Monitoring the participatory budget is the weakest part...when people are not going to win a project...they have no time because they have something else to do...the citizen is not motivated on one hand, and on the other hand the citizens are not trained- there is a great lack of training in how to generate ideas. There you have a serious, very serious, limitation..." (NGO Professional K 2007).

In addition to the in-depth interviews carried out over all three municipalities, a city-wide survey of 371 individuals was implemented in Jesús María given that it has been singled out by awards as the most successful case of citizen participation in government. Several of the questions addressed the perceptions citizens held of their own capabilities for understanding a budget and a public works project. Discovering if the person understands how to evaluate budgets and public works would be time-prohibitive, so instead, respondents were asked to provide basic facts about their city as a proxy for being involved enough to learn about budgeting or evaluating public works. Although 49.2% of people believed themselves very well-trained or well-trained to evaluate a municipal budget,

Table 2:
Survey Question: How well-trained do you believe you are to examine budgets to evaluate if the municipality is spending its resources competently

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Very Well-Trained	40	10.8	10.8
Well-Trained	142	38.3	49.2
A Little Bit Trained	116	31.3	8.5
Not Trained At All	59	15.9	96.5
No Response	13	3.5	100.0
Missing	1	0.3	
Total	371	100.0	

less than 5% of respondents could pinpoint the population of their city to within 25% above or below the correct population, and only 7.5% could name a current member of city council. It is improbable that citizens who have little idea about the size or current political affairs of their district are well-trained in the arcane art of reading

municipal budgets. Furthermore, if these questions pose problems for the educated citizens of Jesús María, citizens in other districts will likely perform at below this level.

Citizen involvement in all districts was low relative to the expectations of well functioning co-governance. Although all interviewees believed in the idea of participation, comments such as this one, from Citizen Leader D of Villa El Salvador, were common: “Before, there were 600 people [participating], this time, 300.” When asked why, Citizen Leader D said simply “people have lost interest” (Citizen Leader D 2007). Citizen Leader D’s estimation of participation is correct. In Villa El Salvador, a municipality of 400,000 people, although 1500 people signed up on the rolls at the beginning of the participatory budgeting process, not all those who signed up participate at the training sessions or meetings, and some never return to participate at all. Personal observation of the formalization of agreements ceremony at the end of the participatory budget yielded a count of about 400 attendees; the attendance was officially counted by the municipality at 364 people.

Residents of Jesús María, the successful case, were asked if they had participated in any of these participatory institutions. Given Jesús María’s “successful experience,” if people did not participate there, it would be difficult to imagine more interest in participation in less “successful” districts.

In the survey, citizens of Jesús María expressed a willingness to participate, a belief that they possessed sufficient time to do so, and a belief in the importance of citizen participation. Over half of citizens surveyed in Jesús María stated that they were always or sometimes personally willing to actively participate in the planning of the district. 72.0% responded that they would always or sometimes be willing to publicly denounce irregularities in municipal government.

However, 25.9% of respondents declared that they had heard of the participatory budget, but participation in the co-governance institutions drastically underperformed this figure. For example, 1.6% of citizens had participated in participatory budgeting to the degree that they actually knew who managed the participatory budgeting process.

Table 3:
Survey Question: You personally are willing to actively participate in the planning of the development of the district always, sometimes, rarely, or never?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Always	40	10.8	10.8
Sometimes	142	38.3	49.2
Rarely	116	31.3	80.5
Never	59	15.9	96.5
No Response	13	3.5	100.0
Total	371	100.0	

Table 4:
Cross-tabulation of Survey Question: Have you ever participated in some activity of the participatory budgeting in your district?* **Survey Question: As you understand it or have heard, who manages the participatory budget in your district?**

		As you understand it or have heard, who manages the participatory budget in your district?					
Have you ever participated?	District Mayor	The Technical Committee of the Municipality	The Committee for Local Coordination	The Citizen Leaders in the District	Do Not know	No Response	Total
Yes	1.6%	1.6%	0.3%	0.3%	0.8%	0%	4.9%
No	5.1%	4.9%	2.1%	0%	8.9%	0.5%	21%
Total	6.7%	6.5%	2.4%	0.3%	9.7%	0.5%	26%

Total percentage is less than 100% because 74% of respondents had not heard of the participatory budget. Percentages subject to rounding.

* Cross-tabulated

Citizens in Jesús María were also asked survey questions to determine if they factored a candidate's support of participatory institutions into their electoral decisions. To avoid asking the direct and easily predictable "do you believe participation is important in your elected leaders?", survey questions asked respondents if they approved of Metropolitan Lima's mayor, who has a reputation for competently building many public works but of ignoring the participatory institutions present at the greater metropolitan level. Respondents approved of him overwhelmingly at 81.6%, suggesting that ignoring participatory institutions has little electoral downside if a leader is perceived as honest and builds many public works.

Further pursuing the electoral impact of supporting participatory institutions, respondents of the survey were asked to name the top three problems in the city. Lack of participation did not appear. They were also asked to choose their top three priorities, from a list of ten common municipal activities which included "call meetings of participatory budget," among other common activities. Calling meetings of the participatory budget was one of the three lowest vote receivers for the first, second, and third most important activities. Interviewees from Barranco were quick to point out that their municipality had not carried out a participatory budget in 2006, and nobody demonstrated in the streets on account of the co-governance institutions there.

*The Mayor as essential figure in the success of
co-governance institutions exhibits limited interest in these institutions*

Much of the success or failure of these institutions has been identified to depend on the discretion of a municipality's mayor, so attempting to understand the mayor's conception of the relation between his or her administration, co-governance, and accountability is essential. Speaking with the mayor of Villa El Salvador and the former mayor of Jesús María during in-depth interviews, it was clear that these leaders believed in the importance of outreach and communication to the citizens. They also stated that participatory budgeting aided in learning citizens' preferences and demonstrating that the municipality was undertaking projects (Mayor of Villa El Salvador 2007, Former Mayor of Jesús María 2007). The former mayor of Jesús María declared, "direct communication with the citizens is the best way to make them feel that you are with them." He went further, declaring the participatory budget was a notable part of his communication strategy and saying, "the advantage [of the

participatory budget] is that you find out what the citizens want and do what they want” (Former Mayor of Jesús María 2007).

However, when asked what factors helped them win re-election, the mayors expressed a firm belief that the key determinants to their re-election were whether the citizens see the mayor as a good person and whether the mayor had provided good public works projects (Mayor of Villa El Salvador 2007, Former Mayor of Jesús María 2007). The electoral loss of the mayor of Jesús María (2002-2006), who promoted that famous participatory experience, to an “efficient services” platform of a conservative party’s candidate suggests that supporting participatory institutions may not play an important role in electoral strategy. However, this former mayor attributed a great deal of his loss to uninformed voters who live outside of the district and voted his challenger in on the coattails of the previously mentioned non-participatory mayor of the Greater Lima Metropolitan Area (Former Mayor of Jesús María 2007). This particular case of Jesús María was also marred by scandal in the final weeks of the election that complicates using it as an example. A study that evaluated mayoral support for participatory institutions and compared it to their electoral outcomes over many cases might clarify the relationship.

In addition, the two mayors shared the sentiment that promoting participation was a challenge for their municipalities. They said that citizens often wanted a public works project in their own neighborhood, atomizing the budget and hindering the municipality from addressing larger, long-term development projects. In this way, they lamented, participation could block a good mayor from executing needed projects. They believed that the population at large was still unaware of the participatory budget, and considered themselves good stewards of the public trust for having advanced the process as far as they had, considering the lackluster records of other municipalities (Mayor of Villa El Salvador 2007, Former Mayor of Jesús María 2007).

Forty-nine out of fifty non-mayoral interviewees believed that when a mayor facilitates co-governance experiences, he does so either out of the goodness of his heart or because it is the law, not because of political necessity. The responses of these interviewees and the interviewed mayors themselves suggest that few mayors believe their electoral fortune depends on promoting co-governance. Survey results support this supposition. If true, the inability of co-governance institutions to achieve relevance to the office of a municipality’s most powerful concentration of power

makes it yet more unlikely that these institutions can be used to demand greater accountability.

V. Analysis of the contribution of Co-Governance to greater accountability in its proper context

Co-governance is not yet measurably improving the accountability of governments or politicians in Peru. On this topic, the lesson of Jesús María is particularly instructive. It is a national best case scenario and received top national awards for its citizen involvement and participatory budget. It held more meetings of the participatory budget, involved a higher percentage of its population, and reached out to more under-represented groups than other municipalities. Yet observers spoke ardently about the problems with the process and criticized the capability of the citizen leaders to hold the government accountable to the participatory process. Survey results show a low level of participation in the co-governance institutions and in other areas of civil society. It appears that citizens of Jesús María may not even consider the affinity for participatory reforms to as a means to discern between governments at all, as they expressed high approval ratings of the mayor of Metropolitan Lima, a non-supporter of participatory institutions. The participation-oriented former mayor himself seemed to see participation as less important than a host of other initiatives and characteristics important for winning reelection. And it shows in his policies; budget analyses reveal a rejection of citizen preferences in the municipal budget and missing funds for the completion of participatory budgeting projects. That all these inconsistencies plagued one of Peru's most lauded co-governance experiments offers further evidence that co-governance has not yet contributed to a systematic improvement of government or politician accountability.

However, the manifestations of co-governance's weakness for improving accountability are different than the causes of the weakness. The analyses, surveys, and interviews executed in this study offer clues to the underlying causes of the participatory institutions' inability to measurably improve accountability. Among the problems most criticized is the institutional design of co-governance institutions. Many theorists and practitioners have faulted the institutional design of the participatory institutions. In other nations, it has been shown that the top-down creation of the participatory reforms was an attempt by the participatory Left to jump-start the

efficacy of the institutions, in effect opening up an opportunity for citizens to use their energy to strengthen the institutions (Wampler 2004). It is possible that this strategy was tried in Peru, but the evidence shows the goal has not yet been realized. The weaknesses of the institutional designs, perhaps a product of political weakness of participation supporters in the national government, may have stunted participatory institutions' success. Current weaknesses of institutional design include the vagueness of participatory laws and the fact that participation is not open to the public but requires an invitation and bureaucratic hurdles that limit who can participate (Remy 2005). Critics say that lax institutional design allows unwilling mayors to ignore participation. Some theorists respond that institutional specificity could bring actual renditions of accounts several times a year, a minimum level spent on participatory budgeting, and a roundtable against poverty with powers to motivate local authorities to listen to its policy pronouncements (Chirinos 2005). More institutional specificity could force local governments to include all marginalized groups. The positive consequences could be higher levels of participation among citizens, more citizen demand for participation, and more effective co-governance institutions.

This group of criticisms and their responses are important, but caution should be stressed to those that believe there is a straightforward institutional design fix for the weaknesses in participatory institutions. Consider the current participatory budget law. Even with the current, undemanding standards for implementation, some municipalities in the capital city shirk the law and complete their budgets in a weekend or do not do them at all (Ministry of Economics and Finances 2007 Records). The government lacks the resources to enforce better compliance, so the usefulness of additional, more exacting laws is questionable. On the other hand, questioning institutional design is another way of saying that institutions must be made to work with citizen incentives, a lesson that political scientists, economists, and policymakers have taken to heart. Given that evidence shows a very strong unwillingness on the part of the majority of citizens to participate under current conditions, with no guarantee of higher participation if institutions are changed, perhaps it makes sense to focus on the lack of participation itself.

When thinking about possibilities for institutional improvement, it is important to ask why Peruvians do not take advantage of these limited participatory openings and demand stronger co-governance implementation to promote accountability. Interviewees involved in the process suggested that time constraints kept others from participating as they did. Under co-governance in Peru, citizen leaders and citizens are

charged with proposing policy, rooting out corruption, and monitoring implementation, often with little outside help. Effective participation means doing all these activities well, which has immense costs in terms of time and resources. A scarcity of time to actively participate is a long-standing theme in political science literature. Peruvians make choices about what to do with their limited time. Their families, jobs, desire for leisure, and civic duties outside the co-governance institutions compete for their time. As a result, citizens' incentives may lead them to participate little or ineffectively, which leads co-governance to flounder. But because the success of the co-governance institutions depends on citizen participation, the situation creates a negative feedback loop. Poor participation enfeebles the institutions, lessening participation in them, and lessening the population's demand for stronger co-governance institutions. Complicating these interactions still further is the degree to which co-governance complements or debilitates other more traditional forms of accountability.

Other studies have treated the degree to which participatory institutions might complement traditional roles of accountability, which is certainly possible. But it is equally possible that the opposite is true. Peruvian theorists have pointed out that one particular weakness of Peruvian co-governance as regards improving accountability is the degree to which it has been converted by its proponents from one of many political options for reform into a technocratic and depoliticized solution to Peru's problems (Remy 2005, Wampler 2004, Huber 2005). Many interviewees seemed to have accepted the idea that participatory budgeting would be a technical process devoid of politics for the betterment of the city. For example, in his comments on the central goal of participatory budgeting, Citizen Leader A signaled that belief, saying that the goal was, "to do projects for the benefit of all of the district" (Citizen Leader A 2007). Citizen Leader C, who did not have a project approved, agreed, saying, "participatory budgeting is for the well-being of all of the district" (Citizen Leader C 2007). As has been reported earlier in this study, many citizens perceived the entrance of politics into participatory budgeting as a major problem. But the idea of deciding hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars of municipal budgets without having politics enter seems unrealistic. Rather, this image of depoliticized decision-making allows politicians to have their way and escape accountability perpetually because they can blame any decision on the supposedly technical prioritization process (Remy 2005). It maintains the public's attention on the relatively small part of the municipal budget that is decided through co-governance, instead of the entire budget (Huber

2005). In short, this charade of depolitization distracts citizens from understanding the levers behind the government decisions they observe, which makes citizens' jobs more difficult and raises the cost of effective participation. That participatory decision-making is not found in many decisions of national political import such as trade negotiations and mineral revenues begs the question of how these vital national issues are supposed to be monitored by the public (Remy 2005). In addition, depolitization makes it very difficult for policymakers to have an honest discussion about how politics affects the strength of the institutional design of these participatory institutions. It creates difficulties for leaders and practitioners who wish to honestly compare alternatives to participatory institutions.

VI. Conclusion

Both a fundamental misalignment between citizen incentives and the participatory institutions, as well as the depolitization and ending of political debate around the values of participation, exacerbate the powerlessness of Peru's current co-governance regime to enhance accountability. Yet the mere existence of these serious problems, confirmed by the field work in this study, offers the most useful lessons for further research. In fact, institutional design has indeed been weak, and to improve the design of participatory institutions more political and financial capital would be needed, but whether or not the effort would best be focused in furthering participatory institutions or investing in other institutions remains an important question, given the limited resources available to strengthening accountability and democracy. It requires consideration of the obstacles to creating more successful institutions, whether participatory, liberal-democratic, or other. The argument of participatory institutions as a complement to more traditional institutions also needs to be evaluated under the same criteria. If participatory institutions are failing to enhance accountability, as well as obscuring honest policy talk about institutional arrangements that might do so, those participatory institutions would have to seriously contribute to other institutions' functioning to make up for these deficiencies.

Most important of all these obstacles, citizens have shown a great unwillingness to spend the time and seem to lack the expertise to participate effectively in co-governance without additional support. This study reveals fundamental problems with asking citizens who lack incentives and resources to act as

state watchdog, a position vacated by the supposed checks and balances of the state itself and the reluctant, impotent, or decommissioned condition of liberal-democratic and other institutions. Unless the citizenry of Peru decides that these co-governance institutions are worth their time and energy on top of the normal electoral process, it will be difficult for these institutions to impact accountability. But improving citizen participation, as has been said, requires a reform of the institutions in some way to attract those citizens.

Against this backdrop of underperformance, institutional change has been slow, and debate has been limited. Although the Ministry of Economics and Finances annually releases legally binding ministerial orders and non-binding guidelines to improve the functioning of the participatory budgets, at the time of this study the ministry had already been releasing ministerial orders for four years beginning in 2004. Yet this study documented serious weaknesses in these institutions' capability to improve accountability, suggesting the Ministry's orders may not be achieving their desired effect. Additionally, the Ministry finds it politically difficult to chastise unresponsive local governments, and institutions like the rendition of accounts and the CRSAP appear bereft of any official mechanism of enforceability. As of this writing, support for participation remained healthy, but there could be a risk in the future. For several years, the Left in Peru has promoted participatory institutions as a step toward better democracy. If these co-governance institutions continue to fail to deliver, and this version of democracy turns out not to be as effective as the Peruvian citizenry expects, Peruvians may turn away from a democracy that does not perform; they may overlook the past and opt for another, less democratic path. There is considerable debate in Peru over the proper direction to take with the co-governance institutions. Some leaders opine for more legal specificity, others argue for more legal flexibility. But all of these arguments focus on how these particular institutions can be made to work best and ignore the broader context in which the participatory institutions exist. Improving democracy may not depend on making a certain, fixed set of institutions work best. It may require experimentation that could include changes in the electoral process or government structure, reform and strengthening of liberal-democratic institutions, other institutions, or a more local-led approach to participatory governance as has found measurable success in Brazil. Experimentation is what birthed the co-governance institutions in the first place; should it stop now?

The co-governance institutions have weaknesses, just as all institutions do. Given that the overall goal is to improve the quality of democracy, this study suggests

that additional research examine co-governance in its greater context. Instead of asking how co-governance can function best, it would be prudent to further study which institutions and approaches should receive the scarce available resources, the support of the Peruvian citizens and their political leadership, and the encouragement of the international community in order to best strengthen democracy.

VI. Appendix: Methodology and Sample Design

Cast Study Selection Methodology

In the chart below, fulfilling each requirement of the participatory budgeting law gave a point to the municipality, with multiple meetings carried out counting as multiple points. A “0” signifies determination that the requirement was found to be not fulfilled. Blank spaces indicated that the information was not available in the participatory budgeting documents or other municipal documents, and points were not credited to the municipality in those cases.

Table 5:
Survey of Municipalities’ Compliance with Participatory Laws

Survey on Participatory Institutions Municipality →	Villa María del Triunfo	Jesús María	Independencia	Villa El salvador	San Luis	San Miguel	San Martín de Porres	Miraflores	La Molina	Barranco
Basic Information										
1. The municipality has a website?	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	(Did not complete participatory budget in 2006)
2. The website is updated?	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	
3. So that the necessary information could be incorporated into the opening year municipal budget, the prioritization of projects was concluded June 30, 2006 at the latest?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	

<p>Survey on Participatory Institutions</p> <p>Municipality →</p>	Villa María del Triunfo	Jesús María	Independencia	Villa El salvador	San Luis	San Miguel	San Martín de Porres	Miraflores	La Molina	Barranco
4. The local government presented the approved projects to the Office of National Director of Public Budgeting for approval by October 2nd, 2006 at the latest?	0	1			0	0	1	0	1	
5. The information about advances and results from the Participatory Budgeting Process is registered on the central government website "Website for the Participatory Budgeting Process for Fiscal Year 2007"?	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	
The organization and development of the participatory budgeting process was under the direction of the Council for Local Coordination?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
The Participatory Budgeting Ordinance for the year 2007 included and specified the mechanisms of identification and registration of the participatory agents?			1	1	1	0	1	1	0	
The Participatory Budgeting Ordinance for the year 2007 included and specified the timeline of work for the development of the actions of the Participatory Budgeting Process?			1	0	1	0	1	1	1	
14. The Participatory Budgeting Ordinance for the year 2007 included and specified the responsibilities of the participatory agents?			1	0	1	0	1	1	1	

(Did not complete participatory budget in 2006)

Survey on Participatory Institutions Municipality →	Villa María del Triunfo	Jesús María	Independencia	Villa El salvador	San Luis	San Miguel	San Martín de Porres	Miraflores	La Molina	Barranco
	15. In the Participatory Budgeting Ordinance for the year 2007 was it specified how the Technical Committee was composed and what were its responsibilities during the process, taking into account the duty of guaranteeing the inclusion of representatives of civil society?			1	0	1	0	1	1	1
16. How many capacity-building workshops were realized in the district for the 2007 participatory budgeting process?	0	10	7	2	1	0	3	1	1	
16. How many working-day workshops were realized in the district for the 2007 participatory budgeting process?	0	10	8	6	1	2	2	7	1	
20. How many meetings of the Rendition of Accounts were realized in the year 2006?	1	1	2	1	0	0	1	0	1	
21. In the rendition of accounts of 2006, the population was informed about the completion of the approved projects from the participatory process in the year before?		1	1	0				1		
22. In the rendition of accounts of 2006, the population was informed about the failure to complete any approved projects from the participatory process in the year before and why those projects had not been completed?		1	0	0				0		

Survey on Participatory Institutions Municipality →	Villa María del Triunfo	Jesús María	Independencia	Villa El salvador	San Luis	San Miguel	San Martín de Porres	Miraflores	La Molina	Barranco
	23. In the rendition of accounts of 2006, the population was informed with respect to the investment realized in local development and the degree of advance in the implementation of the concerted development plan?		1	0	0				0	
24. In the rendition of accounts of 2006, the population was informed about the completion of the projects and works of the municipal government and the municipal expenditures?		1	0	0				0		
Total:	2	28	23	13	7	5	14	14	10	

* Translated and adapted from spanish version

Interviewee Selection Methodology

Interviewees were selected according to their relation to the process according to the following schedule in each municipality based on their involvement from the years 2005 and 2006 to correspond with other data collected in this study: Mayor, City councilperson from ruling party, City councilperson from a minority party, Employee of non-governmental organization participant on the technical committee of participatory budget, Employee of non-governmental organization in the community not part of the technical committee of the participatory budget, Representative of a ministry involved in participatory budgeting, Local press reporter, Greater Lima press reporter, Director of citizen participation for the municipality, Leader of the technical committee of the participatory budget, Another member of the technical committee of the participatory budget, Two (2) citizen leaders whose projects were approved (from different neighborhoods and with different project themes), Two (2) citizen leaders whose projects were not approved (from different neighborhoods and with different

project themes), Citizen leader who participates in the CRSAP, Citizen leader who participates in the PDC, Representative of a ministry that is involved in the CRSAP, Two (2) citizen leaders that did not participate in any co-governance institution.

Note: Interviews could not be carried out with 1) the mayor of Barranco due to his unwillingness to be interviewed, 2) a citizen leader from Barranco who participates in the CRSAP because no citizen leader participates, 3) a representative of a ministry that is involved in the CRSAP of central Lima because none participates, 4 and 5) a city councilperson from the ruling party and from the minority party in Jesús María due to unwillingness to be interviewed, 6) a leader of the department of citizen participation of the municipality of Jesús María in the former government because the person could not be found, 7) a citizen leader involved in the CDP in Jesús María because none could be found, and 8) a local press reporter because Jesús María has no local newspaper. The total number of in-depth interviews completed was fifty-two.

Survey Sample Design

The survey was conducted as a public opinion survey within a bounded geographical area, the municipality of Jesús María. The survey was developed and the survey area was broken into smaller regions under the guidance of contracted professionals, who also staff the Institute of Public Opinion at the Catholic University in Lima, Peru. Each smaller region contained vastly more possible respondents than necessary in case of refusal to respond by some citizens. Each member of the survey team was to obtain demographically-representative quota of respondents, accomplished according to the following schedule:

Table 6:
Schedule of quotas for survey administration

Sex/Age	18-34	34-59	60 +	Total
Female				3
Male				2
Total	2	2	1	5

Surveyors were enrolled students at the Catholic University in Peru, all with prior experience as surveyors of the Institute of Public Opinion at the Catholic University, and all of whom participated in a comprehensive training session for this survey. 40% of all surveys given to the population were supervised by a team of supervisors with experience at the Institute of Public Opinion. All surveys were also quality-controlled for completeness upon being turned in by survey teams. 371 surveys completed this process, and given Jesús María's population of about 70,000 citizens, the surveys yield a 5.07% margin of error at a 95% confidence level.

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